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FOOTNOTES

Part 1, Chapter 3 (pp. 33-54)

[33:1] Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 33.

[33:2] Ib., p. 34.

[33:3] Ib., p. 36.

[33:4] Ib., p. 37.

[34:1] Bampton Lectures, p. 38.

[34:2] Ib., p. 39.

[34:3] Ib., p. 48.

[34:4] Ib., p. 49.

[34:5] Ib., p. 58.

[35:1] Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 6.

[36:1] Notes on Miracles, p. 32 f., p. 291 f.

[37:1] Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 94.

[38:1] Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 94.

[38:2] Two Essays, etc., p. 50.

[38:3] Dr. Westcott frankly admits this. "Christianity, therefore," he says, "as the absolute religion of man, assumes as its foundation the existence of an Infinite Personal god and a finite human will. This antithesis is assumed, and not proved. No arguments can establish it. It is a primary intuition, and not a deduction. It is capable of illustration from what we observe around us; but if either term is denied no reasoning can establish its truth" (The Gospel of the Resurrection, 3rd ed., 1874, p. 19 f.).

[39:1] Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 95 f.

[39:2] Ib., p. 96.

[39:3] Ib., p. 97 f.

[39:4] Ib., p. 99

[39:5] Ib., p. 100

[39:6] Ib., p. 101

[40:1] Bampton Lectures, 1865, p. 101 ff.

[40:2] Ib., p. 104.

[40:3] Mansel, Aids to Faith, p. 30.

[41:1] Mansel, Bampton Lectures, 1858 (Murray, 4th ed., 1859), p. 40.

[41:2] Ib., p. 56. Dr. Westcott says upon this point: "But though we appeal to the individual consciousness for the recognition of the truth of the assumptions which have been made, the language in which one term of the antithesis is expressed requires explanation. We speak of God as Infinite and Personal. The epithets involve a contradiction, and yet they are both necessary. In fact, the only approximately adequate conception which we can form of a Divine Being is under the form of a contradiction. For us, personality is only the name for special limitation exerting itself through will; and will itself implies the idea of resistance. But as applied to GOD, the notions of limitation and resistance are excluded by the antithetic term infinite" (The Gospel of the Resurrection, 1874, p. 21).

[41:3] Ib., p. 94 f.

[41:4] Ib., p. 95.

[41:5] Mansel, The Philosophy of the Conditioned (Strahan, 1866), p. 143 f.

[42:1] Mansel, The Philosophy of the Conditioned, (Strahan, 1866), p. 144 f. In another place Dean Mansel says: "Ideas and images which do not represent God as He is may nevertheless represent Him as it is our duty to regard Him. They are not in themselves true; but we must nevertheless believe and act as if they were true. A finite mind can form no conception of an Infinite Being which shall be speculatively true, for it must represent the Infinite under finite forms; nevertheless, a conception which is speculatively untrue may be regulatively true. A regulative truth is thus designed not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice; not to tell us what God is, but how He wills that we should think of Him" (Man's Conception of Eternity: An examination of Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time, in a letter to the Rev. L. T. Bernays, by Rev. H. L. Mansel, B.D., p. 9 f.).

[42:2] Ib., p. 143 f.; Bampton Lectures, 1858, pp. 131-175, pp. 94-130.

[43:1] Bampton Lectures, 1858, p. 68.

[43:2] Sir William Hamilton says: "True therefore are the declarations of a pious philosophy. 'A God understood would be no God at all.' 'To think that God is as we can think Him to be is blasphemy.' The Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed; in a certain sense is concealed: He is at once known and unknown. But the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar -- Agnôstô Theô -- 'To the unknown and unknowable God' (Discussions on Philosophy, 3rd ed., Blackwood & Sons, 1866, p. 15, note).

[43:3] "Study of the Evidences of Christianity," Essays and Reviews, 9th ed., p. 141 f.

[44:1] Ib., p. 25. Cf. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i., p. 26.

[44:2] Bacon's Essays, xiii, ed. Whately, p. 183.

[44:3] Aids to Faith, p. 25.

[44:4] Tract, Theolog. Polt., c. vi., § 16, ed. Tauchnitz.

[44:5] Ib., vi., §19.

[44:6] Clement of Alexandria, who quotes the whole of this passage from Xenophanes, makes a separation here from the succeeding lines, by kai talin; but the sense is evidently continuous, and the fragments are generally united. Cf. Clem. Al., Strom., 5:14, §110

[46:1] The Witness of History to Christ, Hulsean Lectures, 1870, by the Rev. F. W. Farrar, M. A., F. R. S., etc., 2nd ed., 1872, p. 26 f.

[46:2] A System of Logic, by John Stuart Mill, 8th ed., 1872, ii., p. 165.

[47:1] Mill, Logic, ii., p. 166 f.

[47:2] Ib., ii., p. 167.

[47:3] The italics are ours.

[48:1] Mill, Logic, ii., p. 168 f.

[48:2] Ib., ii., p. 169.

[49:1] David Hume, Philosophical Works; Boston and Edinburgh, 1854, iv., p. 126.

[50:1] Hume, Philos. Works, iv., p. 130 ff.

[51:1] Hume, Philos. Works, iv., p. 148.

[51:2] Paley, A View of the Evidences of Christianity, "Preparatory Considerations."

[52:1] Paley, 1.c.

[52:2] Cf. Mill, System of Logic, ii., p. 166 f.

[54:1] Mill, Logic, ii., pp. 173, 175.

[54:2] Cf. Mill, Logic, ii., p. 168.
 


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